sidering how much time has been taken up in lectures and proofs {i.e. proofreading for the gargantuan Principia Mathematica] and seeing pUpilS,4 I don't feel seriously dissatisfied. 5 The intense scholarly activity in 1911 that resulted in an impressive set of diverse academic publications and manuscripts was accompanied by a number of personal entanglements that were equally intense and also tumultuous for Russell. Two of these relationships would prove to be especially strained. Late Wednesday afternoon, 18 October 19II, Russell met Ludwig Wittgenstein for the first time. As we know from the numerous accounts available on their relationship, the exchanges between Russell and Wittgenstein were emotionally charged and not always cordial. However, in 19II a second relationship flourished that would prove equally intense.
Earlier in the year, Russell renewed his acquaintance with Lady Ottoline Morrell, thereby setting in motion a liaison that would last six years and a friendship that would last a further twenty-one years. 6 The rela- 4 One needs to view this reference to the demands made on him by his students with some circumspection. In a letter to a lifelong friend, Lucy Donnelly-an American professor of literature teaching at Bryn Mawr College-Russell allows some light in on his commitments to teaching: I am very busy and very happy. I enjoy my young men very much. Only two stuck to my lectures to the bitter end last year [i.e. the academic year 1910-11], but they both got fellowships. As only three fellowships were given, that was satisfactory. This year I have begun with about twenty, but they will no doubt diminish soon. (SLBR, I: 402; my emphasis and insertion) Classes this size are not exactly overwhelming, as Russell himself seems to intimate. The two students who received fellowships were C. D. Broad, the philosopher, and E. H. Neville, a mathematician.
5 SLBR I: 403, letter #286 to Morrell, 13 Dec. 19II; my insertions. In what follows, the use of square brackets denotes my insertions.
6 Lady Ottoline Morrell died in 1938 under unusual circu~stances. Her husband, Philip Morrell had fallen ill and visited a specialist with Lady Ottoline. The doctor bluntly informed both of them that Philip had a serious heart disease and that he had only six months to live. On hearing the news, Lady Ottoline broke down, and for a time partially lost the use of her limbs. To recover, she went to a nursing home for treatment from a long-standing and trusted doctor. To her dismay, she learned that he had suddenly died. Given her will condition, this news apparently overwhelmed her, and she died shortly thereafter. As her editor, Robert Gathorne-Hardy, writes: "This news labour the death of the doctor], which must have struck her, not only as the loss of a friend but also as the irremediable and ultimate denial of health, was too much, and within a shon time tionship would generate a correspondence in excess of 3,400 letters, telegrams and postcards.? Both Morrell and Wittgenstein would leave indelible marks on Russell. My paper is an assessment of the impact of Morrell on Russell's thought. In particular, I shall attempt to accomplish two tasks in this paper: (I) In the first place, I shall show that Russell's 19II view of philosophy appe;lfS to be contradictory, especially in regard to his conception of the Self. (2) In the second place, I shall consider the nature and extent of Morrell's influence on Russell's 19II view of philosophy.
My central thesis is that Russell's conception of philosophy shifts significantly in 19II-a shift in large measure due, or so I argue, to the ramifications of the intense personal relationship that developed between Russell and Morrell at this time. As Miranda Seymour points out in her biography, Ottoline Morrell, Life on the Grand Scale, the year 19II.
"marked the end of what [Russell] described as his imprisonment in 'that cold and unresponsive l~ve' [with mathematics] and the beginning of his larger ... more important career as a philosopher concerned with human matters. His love for Lady Ottoline played a significant part in his transformation."8 My thesis is that this radical, and contradictory, transformation manifests itself where we might least expect to find it: namely, in a compact, self-contained text less than 100 pages in length. I shall show that The Problems ofPhilosophy presents two views of the Self that do not appear to be consistent. Given the centrality of these views . on the Self in his conception of philosophy, it also appears that Russell's 19II conception of philosophy is inconsistent. Let me begin with a con- How does Russell account for this difficulty to solve philosophical questions? While he does not provide us with a specific explanation for this shortcoming with our philosophical questions, the text suggests an answer.
There can be little doubt that, as far as Russell is concerned, the lack ofprogress in philosophy can be traced to a primary source: namely, our ordinary ideas. And problems in this quarter fuel the problems in philosophy. Adopting the fundamental thesis that vagueness and confusion underlie our non-philosophical ideas-and thus that our ordinary ideas are similarly confused and vague-Russell attempts to show his readers that even the most mundane idea can be regarded as logically defective.
As he sees it, even a cursory exposure to philosophical analysis can reveal "all the vagueness and confusion that underlies our ordinary ideas" (PP 3 , p. I; my emphasis). But if Russell is intent on defending a thesis on the status of philosophical questions-and thus presumably on the status of philosophical ideil.f-and if his argument centers on references to ordi-/ nary ideas, he must be committed to a thesis on the tight relationship between philosophical ideas and ordinary ideas. For if philosophical questions are puzzling by virtue of the defective ordinary ideas we rely on in non-philosophical contexts, there must surely be a strong similarity between philosophical and non-philosophical (or ordinary) ideas. While not necessarily committing himself to the radical suggestion that there is no difference between these two sets of ideas, Russell's line of reasoning in the opening section of The Problems ofPhilosophy strongly suggests that for him our ordinary ideas are the misleading naive precursors of our more refined, yet problematic, philosophical i~eas. ," From this it follows that Russell views all questions as mlt~ally. vague and confused. So our failure to engage in careful criti~al invest~gatlons of both the philosophical and non-philoso?~icalquestlons that mteres~uw ill inevitably leave us in a most pernicIous s.t~te: namely, confuslo~. Without the requisite critical analysis, regular cltlzens-suc~as Russell s shop assistants-will continue to face the very same predlcan: ent that philosophers (apparently) face. Whether we are naive shop asslst~ts or sophisticated philosophers, it is thus incumbent on all of us to critically investigate our questions, thereby enabling us to lear~about our defec-
The proposal that we realize the confusion and vagueness tlve leas.
, f h'l underlying our ideas has wide implications for Russell s account 0 p. Iosophy. Before I consider some of these consequences, I want to. ou.tlme the reasons Russell provides in The Problems ofPhilosoph~for t~IS view.
What, then, leads Russell to conclude that our ordmary Ideas are problematic?
. , ' all Russell's argument for the thesis that our ordmary Ideas are logiC y defective, or "vague and confused", is a variant of the~rgu~ent from '11'
Consider the famous example that Russell proVides m the first I uSlon.
h' h R 11 chapter of The Problems ofPhilosophy. While writing IS c a~ter, usse looks around him and remarks on the items that he perce~ves around him on the desk, in the room and beyond, Ifwe could ask(~lm to tell. us what it is that he is looking at, he might reply as follows: .I am looking bl " Now suppose we press him to be more speCific about the at a ta e. f h b' object he perceives. Russell's assess~ent of.th~propert~es 0 teo Ject that he apparently is looking at Will be sl?mficantly mfluenced by a number of factors. To mention a few: he might be overw~elme~by the bright light from the window, and reply that the . This diversity of possible observations leads Russell to conclude that our grasp of reality is not as secure as we initially thought. Our ideas of reality, both philosophical and non-philosophical, are obscure: this is a fundamental shortcoming that manifests itself most forcefully when we attempt to articulate our thoughts about the objects perceived. Many statements of the objects and their characteristics can be produced, each possessing at least an initial plausibility. The multiplicity of possible answers that can be produced in response to questions about our observations of the contents and properties of our world leads Russell to conclude that the probability of anyone statement being correct is very low.
As he bluntly puts it, "any statement as to what it is that our immediate experiences make us know is very likely to be wrong" (ibid, p. 1).11
But this argument to show that our ordinary ideas are confused is central to Russell's overall concern in the first chapter to discover knowledge that is certain. We need to recall that the very first sentence of The Problems ofPhilosophy is a fundamental question about knowledge and certainty: namely, "Is there any knowledge in the world that is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it?" Russell's graphic illustration, that even mundane perceptual acts of tables are complex activities, capable of generating bewildering possibilities for both the perceiver and the analyst, is clearly designed to suggest a negative answer to Russell's opening ques~ion. While he never does offer an explicit response to his leading question, the analysis that follows his opening question strongly suggests that there will always be room for doubt. Now it is important to note that the complexities that Russell alludes to in his famous perceptual example, with their concomitant uncer-II I am not concerned here with the validity of Russell's argument on this issue. The shift from remarks on the possibility of many statements about an object to the suggest ion that they or that anyone is "very likely to be wrong" appears unwarranted and could undermine Russell's conclusion here on the accuracy of our perceptual reports. tainties, compel him to retreat to a more abstract philosophical plane that he appears to find less uncertain. While knowledge of the (regular) world of tables and chairs is uncertain and marked by confusion--due in large measure to our "confused and vague" ordinary ideas-knowledge of the (non-regular, or philosophical) world apparently offers at least the possibility of certainty and clarity. From the (presumably more secure) vantage point of this philosophical world, or perspective, statements about perceptual acts can now be produced that are free of the uncertainties that characterize non-philosophical statements. From the lofty philosophical perspective perceptual acts and their world can now be analyzed and written about with a degree of certainty and precision unheard of in the non-philosophical world. In short, Russell's decision to adopt the philosophical framework, according to which individuals who perceive a world are interpreting sense-data that have perhaps been caused by objects in the external world, is a decision to choose a framework that Russell assumes "no reasonable man could doubt." Irrespective of our diverse (and thus questionable) assessments of the external world's objects and properties, we (apparently) can be sure that perceptual acts involve sensations that provide us with sense-data that need to be interpreted. How we interpret the sense-data appears to be of little consequence to Russell.12 That we have the sense-data, however, does seem significant for Russell, for throughout his analysis, and especially in his concluding remarks in this section, he assumes that their presence in perceptual acts cannot be disputed. I3 This division between the two worlds-the uncertain ordinary world of tables, and the less uncertain philosophical world of sense-data--eomes through most forcefully in Russell's conclusion on perceptual acts. Referring to the perception of his table, he says the following: 12 Russell briefly runs through a few possible interpretations of sense-data, invoking the views of Berkeley and Leibniz in the process. 13 What are sense-data? Russell reifies them as things, unlike sensations that are processes of our consciousness:
Ler us give rhe name of "sense-dara" co rhe thing.r rhat axe immediately known in sensation: such thing.r as colours. sounds. smells. haxdnesses. roughnesses. and so on. We shall give rhe name "sensarion" co the experience of being immediately awaxe of these things. Thus whenever we see a colour.
we have a sensation ofthe colour. but the colour irselfis a sense-darum, nor a sensarion. In critically reHecting on his perceptions of his world Russell intimates th~t he has unearthed a world of definite sense-data that promise the certaInty denied hi~in his other,. more mundane non-philosophical world. The retreat to thiS world of pnvate sensations and sense-data as I see it, leads Russell to assume that he has found a world that now~ffers at least the prospects of certainty and the elimination of confusionprospects denied those who remain content with the mundane world of physical objects. In short, it appears that Russell's world of private sensedata and sensations is his philosophical Eldorado-a fantastic world less en~umber~d by the defects that beset ordinary perceivers in their nonphIlosophIcal world of physical objects.
. On this interpretation, there now appears to be a serious problem WIth s?me of the later pronouncements on philosophy in The Problems of~htlosophy. The fifteenth chapter, which is entitled "The Value of Philos.ophy", mani~ests this tension most explicitly, in my view. Let me s~y a ht.de about thIS final chapter and show how it departs from some of hIS earlIer pronouncements on philosophy.
II. ON RUSSELL'S 1911 CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY:
THE SECOND PHASE In the final"chapter Russell asserts that "philosophy ... aims primarily at knowledge (P: 90), but he adds that this knowledge will not emerge from t~e co~templatton ofthe Self Those philosophies that begin with a conSIderatIon of the Self yield false-knowledge: at~this phil.osophy tha~is foun~ed on~he Self] calls knowledge is ... a set of prejudices, habIts, and deSIres, makIng an Impenetrable veil between us and the world beyond. The man who finds pleasure in such a theory of knowledge is like rhe man who never leaves the domestic circle for fear his word might nor be law. (PP 3 , p. 93) Relying on the contentious assumption that philosophical inquiries that begin with a consideration of the Self are confined to aconsideration of the Self, Russell decries the parochialism he views as integral to this approach. Putting it rather bluntly, Russell asserts that"greatness of soul is nor fostered by those philosophies which assimilate the universe to
Man" (PP, p. 92).14 Genuine knowledge, on the other hand, insists Russell in thapter xv of The Problems ofPhilosophy, must begin with a consideration ofthe external world, i.e. the not-Self The investigation of the external world will, apparently, help to determine the parameters of our private worlds: .
In contemplation ... we start from the not-Selfi and through ics greatness rhe boundaries of Self are enlarged; through the infinity of the universe the mind which contemplates it achieves some share in infinity. (Ibid; my emphasis)
Rather than initiating our investigation from the Self-a procedure that apparently "is a form of self-assertion ...
[that] ... is an obstacle to the growth of Selfwhich it desires ... ", we ought to "start from the not-Self'
(ibid.). To begin from the Self is to demean the external world, in Russell's view:
Self-assertion, in philosophic speculation as elsewhere, views the world as a means ro its own ends; thus it makes the world ofless account than Selfi and rhe Selfsets bounds to t~e greatness of its goods. (Ibid; my emphasis)
This reliance on the Self as an Archimedean point has the effect of imprisoning the mind, suggests Russell, "since it fetters contemplation to Self' (ibid.). Unfortunately, this contemplation will inevitably be distorted and s·ubservient to instinct, self-interest and desire. In short, a barrier will arise "between subject and object", thereby converting our personal and private worlds into "a prison to the intellect" (p. 93). These are strong words! But is this account of the Self consistent with 14 Inquiries that begin from the Self, according to Russell, inevitably "try to show that the world is so similar to this Self that knowledge of it is possible without any admission of what seems alien" (ibid).
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Russell's earlier analysis of perception and the central role played by sensations and sense-data? It would seem not. Did Russell not advise us to retreat from the uncertain world of tables and physical objects to the private world of sense-data and sensations in the opening chapter of The Problems ofPhilosophy? Did his analysis not suggest that this philosophical world offers at least the prospect of certainty and clarity-prospects (apparently) denied our other, non-philosophical world? But the world of sense-data and sensations is the world of the Self-the very same world that in the final chapter of his shilling shocker Russell pejoratively characterizes as restrictive and contaminated. All this suggests that there is a tension, if not an outright contradiction, between the first and final chapters in The Problems ofPhilosophy. The evidence above appears to support the view that Russell's 19U account of philosophy has shifted significantly in the course of the eight weeks that it took to produce the shilling shocker. How do we account for Russell's evolving assessment of the Self in his conception of philosophy? I would like to say a little on this important issue.
III. ON RUSSELL'S EVOLVING ASSESSMENT OF THE SELF IN I9II
Why did Russell's view of the Self-and thus his broader view of philosophy--ehange so drastically in 19u? While numerous explanations for this contradictory transition can be given, two strike me as particularly plausible. For convenience, I shall label these explanations "the certainty explanation" and "the Lady Ottoline explanation". As I shall demonstrate, these are not mutually exclusive explanations. Consider the first one.
Perhaps Russell's assessment of the role of certainty in philosophy changed between the first and the final chapters of The Problems ofPhilosophy. While the concern with certainty appears to underlie the argument from illusion, as I have suggested above, the final chapter stresses speculation, creativity and the liberalization of the minds of those that pursue philosophy. These latter themes tend not to be associated with the constraints imposed by an emphasis on certainty. As a matter of fact, in the fifteen th chapter Russell goes as far as to celebrate uncertainty in his account of the value of philosophy:
The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very uncertainty. (PP3' p. 91; my emphasis) So perhaps Russell's view of the Self (and thus of philosophy) evolved because his assessment of certainty changed between the composition of the first and the final chapters of The Problems ofPhilosophy.
As it happens, Russell himself offers an explanation elsewhere that takes this tack. In a postscript to his Autobiography, which has been published separately as an essay entitled "Reflections on my Eightieth The Problems ofPhilosophy was written the year Russell turned thirtynine. It seems reasonable then to infer that the fault-line in his views on certainty-and hence in his views on philosophy in genelal-ean be traced to this popular text. There appear to be good reasons for suggesting that Russell's views on the Self and of philosophy changed in the shilling shocker because of his reassessment of the role of certainty in philosophy.
. As plausible as this explanation might appear, it still leaves unanswered the more fundamental question on the transition of Russell's views in The Problems ofPhilosophy. At least one virtue of the Lady Ottoline explanation is its ability to account for both Russell's evolving assessment of certainty in philosophy and the modification of his views on the Self. Without further ado, let l,lS consider Lady Ottoline Morrell's influence on Russell's thought in 19II. Lady Ouoline Violet Anne Morrell was a year younger than Russell. By all accounts she was a frail, lonely child. Her father, Lieutenant-General Arthur Bentinck, died when she was four, and as Nicholas Griffin points out, "her brothers, all older than she, were away much of the time and ignored her when they were not" (SLBR, I: 345). These remarks on her youth are borne out by Lady Ottoline herself For instance, her autobiography contains many references to her lonely escapades in Welbeck Abbey-an impressive, expansive estate that she moved to with her mother when she was six.
By her own account, her formal education left much to be desired. Attended to by "numerous private governesses", who apparently were more intent on inculcating the requisite etiquette than educating her, Lady Ottoline received little more than a rudimentary exposure to the three R's. Griffin puts it plainly: "She was brought up to be the wife of an aristocrat and her education was limited to what was thought necessary for this role, that is, to virtually nothing at all" (ibid). Lady Ottoline was acutely aware of these educational limitations, and throughout her extensive correspondence with Russell she draws attention to her "educational shortcomings". She routinely decries the letters that she sends Russell, regarding them as poor inarticulate attempts to express her innermost thoughts. Here are a few ofmany possible examples of her exasperation in 19II. On Two letters written on 5and 6 March 1912 on the lost manuscript Prisons are the longest letters written by Lady Ottoline to Russell in the first year of their relationship. These letters are the most critical in her correspondence, yet they also happen to be the most tentative. There are constant references to her '(stupidity", she mentions her "foolish remarks" on his text, and her suggestions on Prisons, while detailed, are invariably very hesitant (letters 710.081657 and .081658).
Most of her letters to Russell express similar frustrations with her inability to express herself. The editor ofher memoirs, Robert GathorneHardy, attributes this difficulty to her inadequate education at Welbeck:
Her education, in respect to her powers and her ambitions, was defective. It was the result of this, I think, which gave her a smaller vocabulary than might have been looked for in one so widely read. (Ottoline, p. 21) These brief glimpses into her correspondence with Russell compel us to consider the following important question: how could Lady Ottoline, with her severely limited formal education, have had any impact, let alone a significant one, on the philosophical thoughts of one of the twentieth-century's greatest intellects?
In a word, the answer is religion. Lady Ottoline developed a deep and abiding interest in religion in her teens. This interest-perhaps '(passion" is not an inappropriate term-became the focal point of her relationship Mother Julian, almost lost in her voluminous nun's draperies ... the face extremely wrinkled and soft, with amazing eyes.... They had seen the full pain and light of life, still saw the light, and still felt love and reverence. (Ottoline, It was the Anglican nun, Mother Julian, that provided Lady Ottoline with the warm companionship absent from her youth, and it was Mother Julian who, more importantly, helped nurture Lady Ottoline both spiritually and intellectually: "it was to Mother Julian that I owe the adjustment of my intellectual and aesthetic side" (ibid, p. 98). Irrespective of the large, flamboyant "Bloomsbury gatherings" that would congregate at Peppard Cottage at Henley-on-Thames or at 44, Bedford Square, London, Lady Ottoline drew comfort from her close relationship with Mother Julian. In her memoirs, while reminiscing about her friends, Lady Ottoline makes a point of identifYing two people who were especially important in her life. Both of these friends are clerics. In a chapter that encompasses references from her youth to the time of Mother Julian's death,r6 Lady Ottoline identifies a surprisingly s~all group of friends: "My aunt and cousins at Ham Common and mother Julian were the only people that I was friends with!? except, I remember, the late Archbishop of York ... " (ibid, p. 98) . This is a revealing account of her friends, both in terms ofwho is on and who is offthe list.
Individuals who are spiritually inclined are included in the list of true friends, and someone we might have expected to find on the list has been left off: namely, Bertrand Russell. What this all suggests is that Lady Ottoline Morrell was a deeply spiritual woman, impatient with linguistic and intellectual issues, and more concerned with emotional and religious concerns. 16 In her memoirs Lady Ottoline incorrectly identifies Mother Julian's dt>ath-date as 1912. This year does not square with her correspondence with Russell, where her letters from early September 19II make reference to the death of Mother Julian. 17 Lad~Ottoline did not view the large gatherings at her home as especially significant occaSIOns, as far as I can tell from her correspondence-at least that with Russell. A most revealing account of one of these social meetings was written to Russell on 15 July 19II: "We talked politics all the evening. I longed for you. It is a great sadness to me that you are never present at my general talks for one reveals oneself so much when one is able to hide behind a company and dart out now and then, and I cannot help thinking often, oh what a waste that he is not here, but I must be patient and I expect it will come" (letter 710.081444).
As it happens, this is clearly how Russell began to see Lady Ottoline. As the intense passion of late March and April 1911 subsided, Russell slowly realized that his lover had a deep spiritual nature-a spirituality that clearly influenced, if not later completely determined, their relationship. As has been pointed out in a fascinating psychological analysis of the relationship between Russell and Morrell, religious considerations would come to dominate the relationship between the tWo:
However infatuated (Russell] may have been with Ottoline at the beginning, as the relationship developed her spiritual nature would prompt him to tackle serious problems associated with religion.
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While both parties were interested in religion, the magnet, o~so it appears, became Lady Ottoline's spirituality. As Miranda Seymour puts it-perhaps a little too enthusiastically-it was Russellwho was drawn in by Lady Ottoline, and not the other way round. Throughout their relationship, Ottoline never compromised her (religious] beliefs. It was Bertiewho, under her strong influence and in response to his desperate need to find an area in which they could reach agreement, gradually moved away from the cosmic loneliness he had bravely confronted in one of his early and most admired writings, "A Free Mall's Worship". (Ottoline Morrell, p. 123; my emphasis)
Reluctant to accept that she was influencing him intellectually, Russell nevertheless does concede that his relationship with Lady Ottoline changed him. 19 As he begrudgingly puts it, her influence was "almost wholly beneficial".20 While we might quibble about the nature and 18 The analysis is in Maria Forte's unpublished master's thesis, "Creativity in the Relationship between Bertrand Russell and Lady Ottoline Morrell" (McMaster V., 19 8 3; copy in Russell Archives). The quotation is from p. 7 8 .
. 19 In her biography of Lady Ottoline, Seymour suggests that "Russell scholars have been understandably reluctant to stress the influence of a woman who is usually seen as a figure of fun" (p. 4). Bur as she sees it, "it is not only the scholars that are reluctant to concede Lady Ottoline's impact on him, Russell himself, apparently, did everything he could in later life to obliterate the most extreme examples of Ottoline's intellectual influence over him as she encouraged him to give voice to the mystical side of his nature" (p. 12 4). This is an interesting issue that cannot be considered here.
20 Auto., I: 21 4. This influence would sometimes be direct, sometimes indirect. Lady depth of her impact on him, there can be little doubt that Lady Ottoline had a great influence on Russell in 1911-an impact due, in large measure, to her (unwavering) religious views. Now Lady Ottoline's interest in, and remarks on, religious matters did not fallon barren ground. Far from it. Russell had long had an abiding interest in religion. For instance, his youthful "Greek Exercises" is dominated by his views on God, religious belief and arguments on God's existence, and the extensive reading list that he compiled on what he read between 1891 and 1902 is replete with references to religious texts. 21 Furthermore, and most important in this context, Russell frequently mentions Spinoza and his God to Lady Ottoline. As their relationship matured Russell took it upon himself to gently inject more and more philosophy into their correspondence-and the philosopher that features most prominently in this correspondence in the first half of 19II is the deeply religious philosopher, Baruch Spinoza.
22 In addition to numerous brief references to Spinoza in this correspondence, the only occasions where he considers the thoughts of a philosopher in some depth with Lady Ottoline occur when Russell deals with Spinoza's thought. On 24 May 19II, for example, Russell provides her with a detailed account of his understanding of Spinoza's conception of "the intellectual love of God". On 10 July, while staying at Upper Wyche, Russell enthusiastically writes about the philosophers he would like to Ottoline's later involvement in the creation of "The Perplexities of John Forstice", for instance, is an example of direct intervention that Russell would come to regret. As he ruefully puts it, "the second part [of Forstice] represented my opinions during only a~ery shon period. My views in [it] were very sentimental, much too mild, and much too favourable to religion. In all this I was unduly influenced by Lady Ottoline Morrell" (Papers 12: 127).
. 21 The reading list is published under the heading "What Shall I Read?", Papers 1: 353ff.
22 Not all commentators regard the relationship in this light. In his work on the role of Spinoza in Russell's thought, The Spinozistic Ethics ofBertrand Russell (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985) , Ken Blackwell suggests that it was Spinoza's ethics that both attracted Russell and became central in the relationship between Russell and Lady Ottoline: As Blackwell puts it, "The place of honour laccorded Spinoza] can be explained only by the extremely high regard in which Russell holds Spinoza's ethical contributions" (p. 72, my emphasis) . This interpretation does not appear that different to mine if we remember that the person who seeks to understand [Spinoza's] God-i.e. the universe-seeks to acquire an intellectual love of God. And for Spinoza this is tantamount to striving to be a good person.
consider with Lady Ottoline-and Spinoza and Plato head the list: " ... it would be an immense joy to read the things I care for with you-Plato and Spinoza come first in my affections."2 3 And only days before he finished The Problems of Philosophy, Russell writes on the centrality of Spinoza's thought in his life:
I loved reading the Spinoza with you. Ever since I first read Pollock's book, which was when I was an undergraduate, Spinoza has been one of the most . important people in my world. But I find his importance grows greater and greater to me-all my own thought makes me un~erstand him better, and s~e the things he is meaning to say more clearly and wlth more knowledge of the~r importance. I felt an uneasiness until we had shared him. What I want to say IS extraordinarily like what he says. He is the only one of the modern philosophers who has anything of that sort to say. (Letter #168, II Aug. I9 II ) As Russell sees it, Spinoza has helped further the relationship between himself and his lover. Ray Monk, in his biography of Russell, goes even further than Russell on this point, a:nd suggests that Spinoza provided Russell with the framework to more fully grasp the nature of the relationship that existed between Lady Ottoline and himself in the summer of 19II:
The Spinozistic ideal of overcoming strife by transcending one's own finite ego and taking an "eternal" view of the world, and his experience of ha~ing~een spiritually released by his love for Ottoline, had somehow become Identified with the image of having been released from prison. It was as if Russell's love for Ottoline had become for him a living revelation of the religion that he had earlier outlined in "The Pilgrimage of Life": the religion of contemplation. (Monk, I: 227) Unfortunately for Russell, his Spinozistic overtures had a limited success. While Russell was drawn to Spinoza's elaborate architectonic, with its commitment to an austere intellectual love of God, Lady Ottoline 23 Letter #14 0 , 10 July 1911. In this letter Russell goes on to reassure Lady Ottoline that she need not he concerned if she does not initially understand the readings. What matters is the motivation to learn. "Don't be afraid you wouldn't understand enough to make it worth while. The thing that can't be acquired if one hasn't got it is interest in the subject. But you have that, and I could soon find out how to put things so that you would understand, if you always told me when you didn't understand."
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The correspondence strongly suggests that Lady Ottoline found Spinoza's philosophy hard to understand and difficult, if not impossible, to engage with. None of her responses to Russell's written explanations on Spinoza's thought is detailed, and many of the letters make it clear that she is struggling to comprehend his account of God. For instance, when Lady Ottoline responds to Russell's enthusiastic, reasonably detailed account of Spinoza's views (which he referred to as a "lecture"), she does so with a perfunctory remark: " ... I like your Lecture on Spinoza immensely."24 Had she found Spinoza's thought significant, she would surely have been more forthcoming. A few months later, after a summer together considering the views of Spinoza, among other things, Lady Ottoline makes it abundantly clear that she still needs Russell's guidance: "I am anxious to read Spinoza over again with you.
[sic] for now 1 feel you have shown me the essence ofhim and ofhis great vision and I want to make his thought real and living in me."25 After three months' coaching from a leading teacher of philosophy with a reputation for lucidity, Lady Ottoline is still dissatisfied with what she knows of Spinoza: she still wants "to make his thought real and living in me". For all his erudition and determination to help his lover grasp Spinoza's religious views, she remains unmoved. Her heroic efforts notwithstanding, Lady Ottoline had to concede that she could not relate to Spinoza's views on God. Russell had to attempt a different tack. Would.it be possible to unite two seemingly disparate religious dimensions: one intellectual and the other emotional?
In the face of the failure of Spinoza to sufficiently engage his lover Russell turned his attention to another fount for inspiration: Lady Ottoline's significant emotional resources. Russell's search for a comprehensive religious perspective drew him to Lady Ottoline's spirituality and compassion. These essential attributes ofher personality spurred Russell, in the summer of 19II unashamedly focus on emotions and attempt a reconciliation between faith and the intellect. This work on reason, love and faith Russell called "The Religion of Contemplation", or "Prisons". The material must rank, as far as we can tell,26 as one of the most obscure of Russell's works,:z·7 so what I say here must be regarded as highly speculative. Nevertheless, I think that some broad remarks on Prisons can still be made that will help us more clearly understand the influence of Lady Ottoline on Russell's 19II conception of philosophy.
Prisons provided Russell the opportunity to blend his intellectual conception of religion with Lady Ottoline's more instinctive and emotional commitment to God. More specifically, this work, which both of them metaphorically referred to as their child, is Russell's attempt to accomplish two tasks:
(I) On the one hand, he is intent on establishing a harmony between religious belief and emotional love. (2) On the other hand, Russell attempts to show that of the two, religious belief is more significant.
'
Adopting the (Spinozistic) view that "religion consists in union with the universe", Russell argues that only an unfettered or objective soul can acquire knowledge and appreciation ofour infinite universe. Individuals, therefore, who seek knowledge and appreciation of this universe, or notSelf-that is to say, those who seek to love God-must escape the restrictions of the instinctive, subjective Self And the way to unshackle the chains of the Self is to develop an appreciation of the value of 26 I put it like this because the original manuscript and its ryped copies have been lost (or destroyed), and what remains are a few fragmentary pages and the essay "The Essence of Religion", which draws heavily on the ideas in Prisons. See the outline, drafts and essay in Papers 12: 102-9. However, there is reason to believe that some of the text was used in the final chapter of The Problems ofPhilosophy (see Papers 12: 100).
27 Wittgenstein, for one, thought that Russell was "a traitor to the gospel of exactness, and wantonly used words vaguely" (SLBR, I: 438).
2.8 Russell expressed his disappointment over Prisons very soon after completing the manuscript. I suspect that part of his difficulties with this project was the problem of reconciling these two separate tasks. It appears that this issue also bothered Wittgenstein, for when he read "The Essence of Religion", he apparently complained that Russell was attempting to write about issues "too intimate for print" (Papers 12: III).
A Lady, Her Philosopher and a Contradiction religion.
As Russell sees it in 19II, the love of God makes possible all other forms of love. In his view, .his love for Lady Ottoline is sustained by his love.of G?d. In one of hIs letters to Lady Ottoline on the purported relationshIp between religious belief and emotional love, he writes that there ... is what one would call love of God if~ne .b~lieved in God, and in the long run I do not find that any other love can lIve If It comes into conflict with love of God. But love ofyou reinforces love of God and is strengthened by it~(Letter #55, 4 May 191I; quoted in Forte, p. 82) ut the .love. of Go~, according to Russell, that is central to one's relig-IOUS beltefs, IS nothmg but the love of, or reverence for, the universe, or the not-Self And as emotional love, for him, is a manifestation of the instincts~f the Self, his Prisons analysis of the relationship between faith and emotional love appears to be little more than a consideration of the relationship between the not-Self and the Self uss~ll's~tte.mp~to har~onize (and prioritize) intellectual religious beltef with mstmctwe emotional love stirred Lady Ottoline's soul. After reading a portion of Prisons, on 28129 July 19II she pens the following from Peppard Cottage:
I used to feel [th~t my thoughts] could notbe told to anyone but now they come out to you-as If they were your thoughts-as if we were twin souls that had been wondering about the world and had just found each other and in the meeting we illumined each other. It is most sacred happiness. I feel now that our lo~e~oul.d ?e but a haLJaffair ifwe had not found this great soul union too but WIth It-It IS utterly complete and satisfying. (Letter 7 10 . 081 453) These remarks are especially important in our context. Not only do they suggest that Lady Ottoline thinks that Russell has been successful in his attempt to unifY faith and emotional love, they also contain a not too subtle note on the origin of the idea to establish a harmony. In writing to Russell that her thoughts were emerging from him "as if they were your thoughts", Lady Ottoline is making it clear that in her view she is the source of the idea to establish harmony between faith and love. But he union that Lady C?ttoline ecstatically refers to in her 28129 July letter IS surely the same UnIon that Russell later refers to in The Problems of Philosophy. That is to say, this is surely an allusion to the harmony between the Self and the not-Self that Russell so eloquently elaborates on thirteen days later in the final chapter of the shilling shocker.:l. 
